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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided in Commonwealth v. 
Brown that Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner could not reduce or 
alter a death penalty verdict.1 The court held that without a judicial reason for 
error or remand, a prosecutor cannot change an imposed sentence.  While 
the DA’s job is to decide whether a death penalty sentence should be initially 
pursued, until recently, it was rare for a prosecutor to request that an imposed 
sentence be changed.  This comment explores the limits of prosecutorial 
discretion and whether reducing an imposed sentence is or could become an 
appropriate role for prosecutors.  
The comment will be broken up into six parts.  The first part is an 
introduction to Brown and why what recently occurred in Pennsylvania is 
groundbreaking for the greater prosecutorial field.  The second section will 
then explore what prosecutorial discretion means in light of Article II of the 
U.S. Constitution, and how the role of the prosecutor is separate from the 
judicial sector.  The third section analyzes one of the big dividing lines between 
Article II and Article III: the differences between prosecutorial charging 
power and judicial sentencing power.  In the fourth section, I discuss how, 
given the recent increase in trust for prosecutors and a growing distrust for 
judicial decisions, the differences charging versus sentencing decisions is 
blurred. This is especially true in cases where prosecutors aim to reduce a 
sentence. 
In the fifth section I note that, despite a desire for judgment finality, judges 
have had the ability to alter jury verdicts for years with no upset in the validity 
of the justice process.  In states that have expanded this power to include 
prosecutors, courts have noted that prosecutors, like judges, have a strong 
interest in assuring justice.  Especially if a prosecutor suggests a sentence that 
cuts against his adversarial interest, these states note it should be within their 
role to assure justice is found.  
 
1  196 A.3d 130, 146 (Pa. 2018) [hereinafter Brown]. 
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In the sixth section, I conclude that courts are split on whether prosecutors 
changing sentence ex-post is within prosecutorial discretion. Though some 
courts consider this a violation of the separation of powers, prosecutors in 
these jurisdictions should not give up in trying to assure defendants receive 
appropriate sentences.  I recommend that prosecutors focus their arguments 
on the fact that this is not the first time an attorney has held a different 
interpretation of the law than his predecessor. Solicitors General have 
successfully convinced courts to take different stances of the law as a result of 
differing presidential administrations’ beliefs.  If prosecutors made arguments 
that mirrored this stance, they could successfully change sentences without 
expressly expanding prosecutorial discretion and violating the separation of 
powers.  
II.  COMMONWEALTH V. BROWN CHANGES PROSECUTORIAL LANDSCAPE 
In Commonwealth v. Brown, Lavar Brown was convicted for the death of 
Robert Crawford.1 On December 10, 2003, Brown, then age 24, was standing 
in Philadelphia near a school and subway station with a friend.2 A short time 
later, Brown saw Robert Crawford, then age 33, approaching, and Brown 
stated, “[t]here go that pussy.”3 Brown then approached Crawford and shot 
him, without provocation, multiple times in the back.4 On May 31, 2005 the 
court found him guilty of first-degree murder, possessing an instrument of a 
crime, and carrying a firearm without a license.5 On June 2, 2005, following 
the penalty phase of trial, the jury returned, unanimously, a decision that the 
defendant should be sentenced to death.6 
Brown appealed his conviction and raised many issues, one of them being 
that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase 
of his trial.7 On April 9, 2018, Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner 
filed a joint motion confessing error to Brown having ineffective trial counsel.8 
The motion further argued that the sentence should be vacated and a lesser 
sentence be imposed.9 The Commonwealth’s brief argues that prosecutorial 
discretion clearly allows for a prosecutor to vacate and remand for a lesser 
 
 1 Id. at 139.  
 2 Id. at 137.  
 3 Id.  
 4 Id.  
 5 Id. at 139. 
 6 Id.  
 7 Id. at 140. 
 8 Id. at 141. Ineffective assistance of counsel occurs when the defendant’s attorney has failed to 
adequately perform his duties as counsel, and the defendant is prejudiced as a result. See 
Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 429, 439 (Pa. 2011).  
 9 Brown, 196 A.3d at 142.   
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sentence.10 Brown’s brief furthered that the courts for years have reversed 
convictions when both parties agree to an error, and this Court should have 
followed this trend.11  
The court responded that Brown must argue his counsel provided 
ineffective assistance during the penalty phase of trial and convince the fact-
finder to rule in his favor.12 A court must then conduct “a judicial merits review 
favorable to the petitioner before any relief may be granted.”13 The court thus 
disagreed with the Commonwealth’s prosecutorial discretion argument, 
holding that a prosecutor changing an imposed sentence would violate the 
“respective roles and powers of prosecutors and courts with respect to jury 
verdicts.”14 Further, the court decided that the prosecution’s confession of 
error is not a substitute for judicial review because the court, not another 
attorney, should decide whether appropriate representation was provided to 
the defendant.15 Chief Justice Christine Donohue wrote that the jury-approved 
death sentence would remain, and “the differing views of the current office 
holder” couldn’t change that.16 
Despite the court refusing Krasner’s argument to extend prosecutorial 
power, Brown opens a greater constitutional question surrounding the actual 
limits of prosecutorial discretion.  It is important to analyze the expanding 
nature of prosecutorial discretion in light of recent court precedent and greater 
legislative decisions to best understand the contemporary role of a prosecutor 
and where the profession is expanding.  
 
 10 Commonwealth’s Brief in Support of Joint Motion to Vacate and Remand for Resentencing at 6-9, 
Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130 (Pa. 2018) (No. 728 CAP).   
 11 Appellant’s Brief in Support of Joint Motion to Vacate Death Sentence and Remand for 
Resentencing to Life Without Parole at 7-8, Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130 (Pa. 2018) (No. 
728 CAP).  
 12 Brown, 196 A.3d at 150.  
 13 Id. at 145. Furthermore, because the defendant never spoke up and objected to his counsel’s 
effectiveness, the court held that he waived his rights to appeal on this issue at a later time. Id. at 184.  
 14 Id. at 149.  
 15 See id. at 145–46 (maintaining the court’s authority to conduct judicial review on the matter). 
 16 Id. at 149.  
104 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:5 
III.  THE ROLE OF A PROSECUTOR AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Though Brown was a Pennsylvania state law case,17 prosecutorial discretion 
is derived from Article II of the U.S. Constitution.18 The executive branch 
retains broad discretion to enforce the nation’s criminal laws.  The power of 
prosecutorial discretion is based on many Article II clauses, including: The 
Executive Power Clause, the Take Care Clause, the Oath of Office Clause, 
and the Pardon Clause.19 The executive branch is given broad discretion 
because delegates of the President are designated by statute to help him 
discharge his constitutional responsibilities and “take [c]are that the [l]aws be 
faithfully executed.”20 In the absence of clear and convincing evidence, courts 
are to presume that these delegates - particularly prosecutors - have properly 
discharged their official duties.21  
Traditionally, the role of a prosecutor is separate from the judicial process 
because Article II gives the prosecutor charging power while Article III 
provides the court with sentencing power.22 As defined in the U.S. 
Constitution, it is the job of the executive delegates to determine what charges 
should be brought upon a defendant, and the judiciary to determine how 
strictly the defendant should be punished for a guilty charge.23 However, 
sentencing versus charging powers are not clearly defined in Article II or III, 
and courts may mistake the duties of a prosecutor for those of the judiciary.  
One such confusion has been: Who has the authority to assure a case be 
brought to trial? In Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 
 
 17 In Pennsylvania, “[a] District Attorney has a general and widely recognized power to conduct criminal 
litigation and prosecutions on behalf of the Commonwealth, and to decide whether and when to 
prosecute, and whether and when to continue or discontinue a case,” Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 
652 A.2d 1294, 1295 (Pa. 1995) (quoting Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 246 A.2d 430, 432 (Pa. 
1968)).  
 18 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Executive Power Clause) (“The executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.”).  
 19 See id.;  Id. at cl. 8 (Oath of Office Clause) (“Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall 
take the following Oath or Affirmation:—'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute 
the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States.’”); Id. at cl. 1 (Pardon Clause) (“The President . . . shall 
have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases 
of Impeachment.”); Id. at § 3 (Take Care Clause) (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”). See also, Donald A. Daugherty, The Separation of Powers and Abuses in Prosecutorial 
Discretion, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953, 973 (1988) (describing Justice Scalia’s discussion 
of prosecutorial discretion’s Article II origins in his Morrison v. Olsen dissent).   
 20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  
 21 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citing United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 
272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)).  
 22 See id. (describing the relationship between the U.S. constitutional powers delegated to prosecutors 
through Article II  and those delegated to the judiciary through Article III). 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.  
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plaintiff inmates filed actions against the defendants, the government of New 
York, and state and local officials.24 The case arose out of the Attica Prison 
uprisings where prisoners demanded better living conditions and political 
rights.25 The plaintiffs alleged that state and local officials failed their 
prosecutorial duty to bring action against officers and administrators for 
alleged wrongful conduct.26 The court ruled that this was a decision beyond 
judicial oversight,27 and that courts are not to direct prosecutors which 
defendants they should take action against.28 Courts are refrained from 
overturning discretionary decisions of prosecuting authorities, and decisions 
made under prosecutorial discretion are determined to be not reviewable by 
the courts under the separation of powers doctrine.29  
While cases like this demonstrate that it is clearly within the role of a 
prosecutor to bring charges against a defendant, it is also within the 
prosecutor’s discretion to dismiss charges. According to the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure rule 48(a), “[t]he government may, with leave of court, 
dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint.” 30 The extent/limitations of 
“with leave of court” have not expressly been defined, but this rule nonetheless 
clearly vests some discretion in the courts in reviewing charge dismissal.  
Caselaw has suggested, however, that legislatures enacted the “with leave of 
court” language to protect defendants against prosecutorial harassment.31 
Thus, courts have recognized two circumstances in which the district court 
may deny leave to dismiss an indictment: (1) when the defendant objects to 
the dismissal, and (2) when dismissal is clearly contrary to the manifest public 
interest.32 
Even with this explicit check on prosecutorial discretion, courts are still 
limited in what is reviewable, even when the defendant objects, or when it is 
 
 24 Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 377 (2d Cir. 1973).  
 25 Id. at 376-377.  
 26 Id. at 378.  
 27 Id. at 383.  
 28 Id. at 379 (citing United States ex rel. Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 402 F.2d 371, 374 (2d 
Cir. 1968).  
 29 See id. at 379–80 (citing United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5 th Cir. 1965) (reasoning that the control 
over criminal prosecutions falls under executive power, which is separate and distinct from that of 
the judiciary). See also United States v. Oldfield, 859 F.2d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 1988) (choosing which 
charges to bring falls within prosecutorial discretion and is not reviewable by the courts in light of 
separation of powers doctrine). 
 30 FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a).  
 31 See, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n. 15 (1977) (“The principal object of the ‘leave 
of court’ requirement is apparently to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment, e. g., 
charging, dismissing, and recharging, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment over the 
defendant's objection.”).  
 32 Id.  
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“clearly contrary to the public interest.”33 For example, in U.S. v. Jacobo-
Zavala, just before trial, the prosecution and defense struck up a deal that 
charges would be dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea.34 The prosecutor 
informed the court of her intent to drop the charges, but the trial court 
refused.35 The court “did not consider the dismissal to be in the public 
interest,” and forced the trial to continue.36 On appeal, the decision of the trial 
court was found to violate the separation of powers doctrine.37 The court does 
not have endless leeway in deciding whether or charging a defendant is within 
the public interest; charging is for the prosecutor to decide.38  
This is not to say that there are no checks on prosecutorial discretion.  
Limitations assure that prosecutors are not bringing arbitrary charges or are 
being unfair to certain defendants.  
In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause, the decision 
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand 
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.  Within the limits set by the 
legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, “the 
conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal 
constitutional violation” so long as “the selection was [not] deliberately based 
upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitary 
classification.”39 
Decisions in which a prosecutor violates his official duties should be 
subject to judicial review to assure defendants’ their rights and due processes.40 
To help assure defendants’ rights, prosecutors are bound by the 2001 Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Model Rule 3.8 requires a prosecutor to 
disclose facts that may be a hindrance to his or her case in order to pursue the 
furtherance of justice.41 If the prosecution finds any new information relating 
to possible innocence for a client, regardless of when he learns of these facts, 
he has an obligation to disclose them.42 The American Bar Association has 
defined a prosecutor to be “an officer of the court” whose primary duty is to 
 
 33 Id.   
 34 241 F.3d 1009, 1011 (8th Cir. 2001).  
 35 Id.  
 36 Id. 
 37 See id. at 1014 (holding that the “decision not to prosecute . . . is central to . . . executive power . . . 
.” and that the district court “overstepped its authority” by interfering with that decision).  
 38 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (dismissing capital charges and refusing to take 
action is within prosecutorial discretion and is not subject to judicial review).  
 39 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 
(1962)). 
 40 Id.  
 41 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2000). 
 42 Id.  
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seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.43 Even if some 
facts may weaken the prosecutor’s case, he has an obligation to report them to 
assure the defendant a fair trial and his due process rights.  
In light of these limitations, prosecutors retain relatively expansive power. 
The rationale behind vast prosecutorial discretion is that prosecutors should 
be free from any conflicts of interest so that true justice can be accomplished.44 
Because prosecutors often have heavy caseloads and must make quick 
charging decisions, their decisions are, understandably, given deference to 
prevent a backflow in the court.45 Courts are likely to defer to a prosecutor’s 
charging decision unless there is a clear violation of a defendant’s due process 
rights.46  
IV.  THE BLURRING OF EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER 
In recent years, both courts and prosecutors have become unsure of what 
constitutes judicial versus executive powers.47 Part of this confusion is due to 
recent political decisions48 that have increasingly bestowed more sentencing 
influence on prosecutors, despite Article III traditionally noting this to be a 
duty of the court.49 This might initially seem unusual because sentencing 
influence is a form of judicial power.  However, an example of this shift in 
power is mandatory minimum sentencing.50 “Mandatory-minimum sentencing 
policies and the consequent displacement of discretion from judges to 
prosecutors reflect a larger political trend toward distrust of and 
 
 43 CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2017) (“The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, a zealous advocate, and an officer of the court. 
The prosecutor’s office should exercise sound discretion and independent judgement in the 
performance of the prosecution function.”).  
 44 See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“It is as much [the prosecutor’s] duty to refrain 
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one.”); Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 173 A.3d 617, 631 (Donohue, j., 
concurring) (“The prosecutor’s duty to seek justice trumps his or her role as an advocate to win cases 
for the Commonwealth.”).  
 45 Amy Grossman Applegate, Prosecutorial Discretion and Discrimination in the Decision to Charge, 
55 TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY 35, 35-37 (1982). 
 46 Id. at 41.  
 47 Jeffrey Ulmer et al., Prosecutorial Discretion and the Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences, 
44 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 427, 427-28 (2007). 
 48 See, e.g., Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All Federal 
Prosecutors on Department Policy on Charging and Sentencing (May 19, 2010) (on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law) (providing guidance to federal prosecutors 
on their advocacy at sentencing).  
 49 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).  
 50 See, e.g., Ulmer et al., supra note 47 at 427-28.  
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disempowerment of judges and, simultaneously, growth in the trust in and 
empowerment of prosecutors.”51 
Mandatory minimum sentencing is not the only instance of enhancing 
prosecutorial duties and limiting judicial review.  There have been recently-
added provisions in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines with regards to 
sentence reductions.  Section 5K1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the 
“Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement)” notes, “[u]pon 
motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution . . . the court may depart from 
the [otherwise mandatory] guidelines.”52 This provision has greatly limited the 
judge’s role in even the sentencing process.  Under the Guidelines, the 
prosecutor can not only bring whatever charge he deems appropriate, but also 
“make a very precise selection of the ultimate sentence[.]”53 “[T]he judge’s role 
is simply to ratify the choice of sentence determined by the prosecutor.”54  
Prosecutorial discretion not only extends directly in sentencing hearings, 
but prosecutors also influence sentencing when they decide which charges to 
bring and in which court to bring a claim.  In Manduley v. Superior Court, for 
example, the district attorney filed charges in adult court against eight minors.55 
The DA did so pursuant to a California law that granted DAs the discretion 
to file charges against specified minors in state court without a requirement 
that the juvenile court first determine the minor is unfit for juvenile court.56 A 
claim brought in adult court has different sentencing options than does a 
charge brought in juvenile court.  Despite this limitation upon the court’s 
sentencing abilities, the California appellate court found that it did not violate 
the separation of powers doctrine for a prosecutor to decide when and if 
charges should be brought pursuant to this law.57 According to the court, when 
 
 51 Id. (citing Jill Farrell, Mandatory Minimum Firearm Penalties: A Source of Sentencing Disparity?, 5 
JUSTICE RESEARCH AND POLICY 95 (2003)). See also Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247 (1997)).  
 52 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 53 Bennett L. Gershman, The Most Fundamental Change in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of 
the Prosecutor in Sentence Reduction, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1990, at 4. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Manduley v. Super. Ct., 41 P.3d 3, 8 (Cal. 2002).  
 56 Id.  
 57 Id. at 13. See also Nicole Scialabba, Should Juveniles be Charged as Adults in the Criminal Justice 
System?: Results of “tough on crime” policies demonstrate that they have failed, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION (Oct. 3, 2016),_https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/childrens-
rights/articles/2016/should-juveniles-be-charged-as-adults/ (“It is typically within the prosecutor’s 
discretion to determine [if adult or juvenile courts] will initiate the criminal charge . . . There has 
been a rise in [these types of] prosecutorial discretion laws.”).  
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bringing a defendant to court is considered a traditional aspect of prosecutorial 
charging discretion and does not intrude upon the judicial function.58  
Prosecutors have been given even greater deference in their subjective 
decisions of appropriate punishments.  Under the United States Attorney 
General, Eric Holder, in 2013, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) conducted 
a comprehensive review of the criminal justice system.59 In a memo, the DOJ 
identified five goals in order to combat inequities in the criminal justice 
process.60 One of these goals was “to promote fairer enforcement of the laws 
and alleviate disparate impacts on the criminal justice system.”61 To achieve 
this goal, Holder aimed to enact “meaningful sentencing reform.”  He wanted 
to change charging policies so that low-level, non-violent drug offenders 
without expansive criminal histories would no longer be charged with 
“draconian mandatory minimum sentences.”62 The prosecutor was to, instead, 
suggest “sentences better suited to [the defendant’s] individual conduct rather 
than . . . excessive prison terms[.]”63 
In light of the Holder Memo, caselaw, and changes in sentencing 
guidelines, there appears a trend towards allowing prosecutors a greater 
influence in sentencing decisions, specifically around creating more 
individualized, lenient sentences.  From a practical standpoint, this makes 
sense, because prosecutors better understand the weaknesses in cases and 
more intimate details about the defendant.  While the judge only can base a 
sentence off of the information presented before him, a prosecutor has a more 
holistic understanding of the case and can make a more appropriate judgment 
in sentencing.64  
While these changes have not explicitly allowed prosecutors to alter final 
verdicts, there appears to be an element of suggesting lesser, more humane 
sentences that gives prosecutors greater deference.65 Third Circuit Judge 
 
 58 Id. at 195.  
 59 See generally, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM_FOR_THE_21ST_CENTURY_1_(August_2013), available_at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf. 
 60 Id.  
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 3.  
 63 Id.  
 64 See, e.g., Brief as Amici Curiae Supporting the Prosecution at 9, Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 
130 (Pa. 2018) (No. 728 CAP) (“Because the proper exercise of [prosecutorial] discretion requires 
prosecutors to have a high degree of knowledge of the specific facts and consequences of each case 
as well as the policy and other implications to pursue any particular prosecution, courts are ‘properly 
hesitant to examine’ the decisions that fall within a prosecutor’s discretion.”) (quoting Wayte v. 
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).  
 65 See, e.g., In re Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 211-12 (Pa. Super. 2005) (commenting that a prosecutor is 
bound to “withdraw charges when [he] concludes, after investigation, that the prosecution lacks a 
legal basis.”). 
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Stephanos Bibas considered this when he stated, “[e]forcement leeway is most 
troubling when it lets prosecutors push the envelope and expand liability 
under vague statutes . . . . Far more central to prosecutorial discretion, 
however, is the power to narrow liability by choosing not to enforce the law or 
seek the maximum penalty.”66 When a prosecutor suggests a stricter sentence 
than would initially be imposed, it is considered a greater threat to judicial 
review because it could violate the defendants’ due process rights.  On the 
contrary, if a prosecutor suggests more lenient sentences than a judge might 
impose should a case go to trial, courts are more willing to grant deference to 
his opinion.  
The question surrounding the limits of prosecutorial discretion from 
Brown is an unusual issue for the court; historically, it was rare for prosecutors 
to change imposed sentences.  In Brown, the court refused to decide when 
prosecutorial discretion ends, despite clarifying when it can be applied 
expansively or narrowly.67 Even though charging directly impacts the possible 
sentences of the defendant, it is entirely within the prosecutor’s discretion to 
determine if he even wishes to bring a capital charge in the first place.68 If the 
prosecutor decides that this is no longer a viable charge to bring, it makes sense 
that he should be able to dismiss that charge and bring another claim. 
V.  ALTERING JURY VERDICTS 
Despite greater deference being given to prosecutors in recent years, 
prosecutorial discretion has still not expanded to include changing a sentence 
after it has already been imposed.  Although it’s a newer question of law 
whether or not prosecutors should be allowed to alter jury verdicts, judges 
have had the power to overturn jury verdicts since the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.69  Judgements notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) allow 
a judge to make a ruling that is contrary to the jury’s guilty verdict if the judge 
finds that no reasonable jury could have made this decision in light of the 
evidence presented at trial.70 Though, traditionally, it is the job of the jury to 
 
 66 Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369, 
372 (2010).  
 67 Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 145 (Pa. 2018). 
 68 See, e.g., Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2016) (“The importance of this decision 
[to bring a capital charge] and the profound consequences it carries makes it evident that a responsible 
prosecutor would deem it to be a most significant exercise of his or her official discretion and 
professional judgment.”).  
 69 Renée Lettow Lerner, The Rise of Directed Verdict: Jury Power in Civil Cases Before the Federal 
Rules of 1938, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448, 450 (2013).  
 70 See, e.g., 725. ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-4(k) (2013) (“When . . . at the close of all the evidence, the 
evidence is insufficient to support a finding or verdict of guilty the court may . . . make a finding or 
direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, enter a judgment of acquittal and discharge the 
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make determinations of fact and the judge’s job to make findings of law, this 
distinction has been blurred in light of the expansion of JNOVs.  Part of the 
rationale behind this expansion was a growing distrust in juries’ findings as 
cases grew to be more complex and involved multiple independent issues to 
decide.71 Edson Sunderland, a principal drafter of the Federal Rules of 1938, 
noted, “[m]en temporarily called from the ordinary affairs of life, untrained in 
the law, are incapable of performing the functions of judges in any but the 
most primitive communities.”72  
Though some judges remain hesitant to overturn juries’ decisions, many 
have also embraced JNOVs, at least in part, because of increased docket 
pressure and a desire for judgment finality.73 While a concern in Brown is that 
expanding prosecutorial discretion would disrupt the finality of a jury’s verdict, 
judges have had the ability to alter verdicts for centuries.  Despite the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court deciding otherwise, some courts have 
determined that changing imposed sentences is within a prosecutor’s duty if 
this is in the true interest of justice.  For example, in United States v. Maloney, 
the Ninth Circuit held that it was appropriate for a prosecutor to vacate and 
remand a case, even after a conviction, because the reviewing prosecutor was 
concerned that the trial prosecutor should not have made a specific closing 
argument and wanted to assure the defendant a fair trial.74  
 
defendant.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1315.02 (2004) (“If judgment was entered, the court may allow 
the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the entry of 
judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed.”); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 440.10 (2019) (“At any 
time after entry of judgment, the court may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such judgment . . 
. .”); 231 PA. CODE § 227.1 (2015) (2019) (“After trial and upon the written Motion for Post-Trial 
Relief filed by any party, the court may: (1) order a new trial as to all or any of the issues; or (2) direct 
the entry of judgment in favor of any party; or (3) remove a nonsuit; or (4) affirm, modify or change 
the decision; or (5) enter any other appropriate order.”); S.C. R. CRIM. PRO. 50(b) (2019) (“If a 
verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and 
either order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed.”).  
 71 Lerner, supra note 69, at 461.   
 72 Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302, 302-303 (1913).  
 73 Lerner, supra note 69, at 465.  
 74 United States v. Maloney, 755 F.3d 1044, 1046 (2014). See also, Ex parte Rhone, 900 So.2d 455, 
457 (Ala. 2004) (remanding for post-conviction proceedings after the State conceded on appeal that 
the trial court had erred in denying petitioner’s request to amend his petition); Green v. State, 251 
So.3d 798, 799, 800-801 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (remanding on appeal because the State conceded 
that this case must be remanded for resentencing when the defendant was not properly allocuted); 
State v. Laws, 51 N.J. 494, 514-515 (1968) (vacating a death sentence and imposing life without parole 
where conviction of first degree murder was proper, but there was error in the sentencing phase: 
“Under all of the circumstances, including the prosecutor’s waiver of the death penalty, we have no 
hesitancy in concluding that there is adequate appellate power to modify the judgments of conviction 
. . . so that each of the defendants will stand convicted of murder in the first degree with sentence of 
life imprisonment.”) (emphasis added).  
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Courts that have allowed prosecutors so much latitude in altering imposed 
sentences have clung to language that these changes are within the interests of 
justice.  This same rationale is one of the guiding reasons judges have been 
given so much latitude in altering imposed sentences: To help ensure that 
defendants are appropriately and fairly being convicted.  Courts that have 
expanded prosecutorial discretion have recognized merit in a prosecutor’s 
decision to have a downward sentence, primarily because this directly cuts 
against the prosecutor’s interest.75  
In California, this expansion is being taken one step beyond the courts 
through the enactment of legislation that supports the legitimization of this 
power.76 In 2017, California District Attorney Jeff Rosen worked to get Arnulfo 
Garcia, a man who changed his life for the better during a life-sentence, re-
sentenced through support of a habeas petition.77 Through this experience, 
Rosen realized that the limitations imposed on prosecutors for changing 
sentences they believe to be unjust forces prosecutors to go through creative 
“gymnastics to get people resentenced.”78 As a result, Rosen, other District 
Attorneys, and criminal reform organizations supported a bill that allows 
prosecutors this discretion.  Under the bill, if a prosecutor makes a 
recommendation for a more lenient sentence, even after someone has already 
spent years in prison, the judge would be obligated to impose the new 
sentence.79 The rationale behind this bill is that it allows for all sentences to be 
kept up with modern sentencing practices and offers leniency in situations the 
prosecutor deems appropriate.80 
While some have acknowledged and accepted this expansion of 
prosecutorial discretion, not all courts believe this is an appropriate role for 
prosecutors.  In 2019, U.S. District Judge Goldberg ruled on the same issue 
and, again, denied Krasner’s brief for a sentence reduction.  In that case, 
Wharton v. Vaughn, the defendant, Wharton, was sentenced to the death 
penalty after he and his co-defendant, Eric Manson, were found guilty of 
murdering Ferne and Bradley Hart in their home in 1984.81 Wharton received 
the death penalty while Manson was sentenced to life in prison.82 Since he was 
 
 75 See, e.g., Maloney, 755 F.3d at 1046 (commending a U.S. district attorney for moving summarily to 
reverse a defendant’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand his case to the district court).  
 76 Kyle C. Barry, A New Power for Prosecutors is on the Horizon—Reducing Harsh Sentences, THE 
APPEAL, (Sep. 7, 2018), https://theappeal.org/a-new-power-for-prosecutors-is-on-the-horizon-
reducing-harsh-sentences/.  
 77 Id.  
 78 Id.  
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
 81 Wharton v. Vaughn, 371 F. Supp. 3d 195, 196 (E.D. Pa 2019).  
 82 Id.  
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sentenced to death, Wharton has repeatedly appealed his conviction to no 
avail.  In 2019, Wharton, yet again, appealed his conviction claiming an 
ineffective assistance of counsel.83 This time, the Philadelphia DA, Krasner, 
said he would not fight the appeal and asked the judge to grant summary relief 
by taking the death penalty off the table.84 Krasner further argued that if the 
court did so, he would not seek a new death sentence in state court.85 The 
court denied Krasner’s motion, saying it would not change its opinion just for 
Krasner’s personal beliefs when many DAs have come before him saying the 
opposite.86 Wharton’s death sentence remains.87  
At least within Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth, a prosecutor’s attempt to 
vacate an imposed sentence has been held as a violation of the separation of 
powers. Despite the cases mentioned above, many courts are, understandably, 
hesitant to forgo so much of the sentencing power that Article III initially 
bestowed upon them.  While the conversation surrounding expanding 
prosecutorial post-conviction influence is just beginning, in courts that do not 
support this expansion, prosecutors will need to shift tactics and make 
arguments that do not threaten or intrude upon the court’s power.  
VI.  EXPANDING PROSECUTORIAL POWER BY MIRRORING THE 
SOLICITOR GENERAL’S CHANGE IN LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
While more prosecutors are beginning to challenge the breadth of 
prosecutorial discretion, this is not the first time an attorney has interpreted 
the law differently from predecessors.  Anytime there is a change in the 
presidency, the new President appoints a Solicitor General.88 The Solicitor 
General has the dual responsibility of being an advocate for the president while 
also being a counselor to the justices.89 The Solicitor General helps the justices 
reach the appropriate result in the law, particularly in light of the shifts in 
beliefs of the administrations.90 The position bridges the executive and the 
judicial branch, especially surrounding advancing the law in light of a 
presidential administration’s political agenda.  
 
 83 Id. at 197. See also, Julie Shaw, Judge Denies Krasner Office’s Request to Vacate Death Penalty in 
1984 Double Murder, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Mar. 4, 2019), 
https://www.inquirer.com/news/district-attorney-larry-krasner-death-penalty-judge-mitchell-goldberg-
robert-wharton-bradley-hart-sam-hart-20190304.html. 
 84 Id.  
 85 Id.  
 86 Id. 
 87 Id.  
 88 Lincoln Caplan, The Political Solicitor General: The “Tenth Justice” and the Polarization of the 
Supreme Court, HARVARD MAGAZINE, Sept.-Oct. 2016, at 49. 
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.  
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Despite changing political beliefs being so prominent in contemporary 
news, Solicitor Generals have been changing interpretations of the law since 
Archibald Cox started the trend of filing briefs under John F. Kennedy’s 
presidency.91 As one of the first Solicitor Generals to start this trend, Cox felt 
more constrained by past court precedents.92 However, Charles Fried, the 
Solicitor General under President Reagan, filed nearly double the amount of 
amicus briefs as did Cox.93 Fried did not feel constrained by court precedent.94 
For example, he held a different interpretation of the legality of abortion just 
three years after the courts had affirmed abortions were, in fact, legal.95 
According to Fried, “[i]n a real sense, the Solicitor General is responsible for 
the government’s legal theories, its legal philosophy.”96 The Solicitor General, 
though still an important counselor to the Court, has become an important 
player in enacting political agendas.  
Under the Trump administration, the Solicitor General, Noel Francisco, 
has reversed the positions of the Obama administration in four major court 
cases.97 For example, previous Solicitor Generals have read the National Voter 
Registration Act to hold a requirement that a state can only remove someone 
from its voter rolls if it has reliable evidence that the person moved away and 
is no longer a resident.  However, the current administration abandoned this 
reading because this requirement “is found nowhere in the text of the law.”98 
Thus, the Solicitor General advocated upholding a recent Ohio law that 
allowed the state to remove individuals from the voting rolls if they had not 
voted in four years and did not respond to an inquiry assuring state officials 
that they still lived within the state.99  
 
 91 LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW 198 
(1987). See also, Caplan, The Political Solicitor General, supra note 88, at 50 (noting that more 
solicitor generals started to file amicus briefs stating different opinions of the law than previous 
solicitor generals). 
 92 Id at 188.  
 93 Caplan, The Political Solicitor General, supra note 88, at 50. 
 94 Id.  
 95 Id.   
 96 CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRSTHAND 
ACCOUNT 14 (1991). 
 97 Caplan, The Political Solicitor General, supra note 88, at 53. See also Adam Liptak, Trump’s Legal 
U-Turns May_Test_Supreme_Court’s_Patience,_N.Y._TIMES_(Aug._28,_2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/28/us/politics/trump-supreme-court.html (discussing how the 
Justices of the Supreme Court have reacted when changes in the government’s legal positions appear 
to be influenced by the President’s politics). 
 98 Caplan, The Political Solicitor General, supra note 88, at 53.  
 99 Id. As a result of the law, Ohio sent notice to approximately one-fifth of its registered voters (around 
1,500,000 people) in 2012 inquiring whether they still lived in the state since they have not voted 
within the past four years.  Only 15% returned their cards stating that they had not moved while 4% 
returned their cards confirming that they had moved.  The remaining 80% of individuals who did not 
return their cards had their voter registration cancelled by the state. Id. See also, Husted v. A. Phillip 
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Though some Solicitor Generals have been successful in changing the 
court’s interpretation of the law, courts are usually hesitant to break away from 
past precedents and beliefs.  In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the 
Solicitor General under the Obama administration, Donald B. Verrilli Jr., 
made an argument that the government’s position had changed regarding 
whether American courts may hear some cases concerning human rights 
abuses in foreign countries.100 The Court rejected this claim saying that, under 
the Alien Tort Statute, the presumption had always been that U.S. law does 
not apply extraterritorially.101 Chief Justice Roberts’s response to Verrilli 
echoed the argument against Krasner in Wharton by saying, “[y]our successors 
may adopt a different view . . . . [w]hatever deference you are entitled to is 
compromised by the fact that your predecessors took a different position.”102  
Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ concerns, the Supreme Court was still 
persuaded to side with Verilli’s differing perspective in US Airways Inc., v. 
James McCutchen, where it was noted that courts should read the common-
fund doctrine to apply in paying for attorney in medical expenses whenever 
an employer’s contract is silent on this issue.103 As Chief Justice Roberts stood 
by his support for past precedent in his dissent, he simultaneously noted that 
“the position that the United States is advancing today is different from the 
position that the United States previously advanced.”104 Though it may be 
difficult for the Solicitor General to change the Court’s interpretation in every 
circumstance, this position, historically, has successfully spearheaded changes 
in law. 
While Krasner’s argument to expand prosecutorial sentencing powers - at 
least in the Commonwealth - violates the separation of powers, prosecutors 
could mirror the Solicitor General’s arguments in future cases and say they 
have different interpretations of the law than did their predecessors.  For 
example, in Brown, Krasner supported the defense’s position that there was 
an ineffective assistance of counsel.105 If Krasner made an argument that his 
understanding of “ineffective assistance of counsel” differed from his 
 
Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1846 (2018) (holding that the Ohio program complied with the 
National Voter Registration Act); Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624  (2018) (holding 
that arbitration agreements in employer contracts must now be upheld even though, under the 
Obama Administration, the court took a different stance in support of the employee’s rights under 
the National Labor Relation Act). 
 100 569 U.S. 108, 123 (2013) (citing Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial 
Support of Affirmance at 8 n.1, Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108 (No. 10-1491)).  
 101 Id. at 124. 
 102 Liptak, Trump’s Legal U-Turns, supra note 97. 
 103 US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 101 n.7 (2013).  
 104 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88 (2013) (No. 11-
1285).  
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predecessors, he could be successful in persuading the court to vacate the 
verdict and remand for a new sentencing hearing.  
If attorneys are successful in convincing courts to change their 
interpretations of the law, given other increases in legislative power and 
political trust for prosecutors, it would not be surprising for state or federal 
legislatures to enact a statute that would authorize prosecutors to have the 
discretion to reduce sentences in the limited circumstance when both the 
defense and State agree on a motion to reduce or vacate a sentence.  In fact, 
this may be the natural next step for humanizing sentences.106  
Though there is a concern that these statutes could intrude on judicial 
power, in light of recent caselaw and legislative decisions,107 this would likely 
not be the case when the prosecution is seeking a lesser sentence than the 
court originally imposed.  Though a prosecutor seeking stricter punishment 
for a defendant could disparately effect and prejudice certain defendants, 
courts have been more deferential to prosecutorial decisions when it comes to 
lessening sentences or encouraging more humane treatment of defendants.108  
Some may worry that expanding prosecutorial influence in sentencing 
could be giving prosecutors too much power as a practical matter.  They may 
argue that allowing prosecutors this discretion would leave them unchecked 
by the system.  Though unbridled prosecutorial discretion is never a goal, it is 
important to remember that prosecutors, especially as public officials with 
their reputations and careers in the spotlight, have the unbridled check of the 
democratic process.109 For example, Larry Krasner is one of Philadelphia’s 
 
 106 Bibas, supra note 66, at 372.  
 107 See, e.g., United States v. Maloney, 755 F.3d 1044, 1046; Barry, supra note 76.  
 108 See e.g, Maloney, 755 F.3d at 1046 (deferring to a prosecutor’s decision to reverse a conviction and 
vacate the sentence); Ex parte Rhone, 900 So.2d 455, 457 (Ala. 2004) (remanding for post-conviction 
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a death sentence and imposing life without parole where conviction of first degree murder was 
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will stand convicted of murder in the first degree with sentence of life imprisonment.”) (emphasis 
added).  
 109 See, e.g., William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits 
of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1325, 1342 
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more progressive District Attorneys.110 Krasner ran and was elected on a 
campaign that wanted to reduce the number of harsh sentences some 
defendants receive.111 Krasner said he wanted to reduce the amount of people 
who would be sentenced to and receive the death penalty.112 Despite this more 
lenient sentencing limitations, Krasner was elected to be the DA by his 
constituents.113  
If the greater public is not satisfied with the sentencing decisions that 
officials like Krasner make, the public can choose to vote them out of office 
and instead elect an individual whose sentencing beliefs better reflect the 
sentiment of the community.  Perhaps this is one of the reasons policy-makers 
and legislatures, in recent years, have blurred the duties outlined in Articles II 
and III, deferring more power to the prosecutor and limiting judicial oversight.  
When a prosecutor suggests that a sentence be reduced, especially when the 
public has voted that prosecutor into office, lessening the sentence could be 
viewed as a more democratic decision.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 Prosecutorial discretion has been a widely debated and expanded concept 
throughout judicial history.  The original intent of Articles II and III in the 
United States Constitution note that the executive branch, which includes 
prosecutors, primarily handles charging,114 and the judicial branch primarily 
handles sentencing.115 However, recent changes in legislative procedures and 
policy have blurred this distinction by providing more power to prosecutors 
and limiting the weight of judicial oversight.  
Despite this enhancement of prosecutorial power, the Pennsylvania court 
in Commonwealth v. Brown decided not to grant both the prosecution and 
defense’s appeal to vacate the capital sentence for Mr. Brown.  As it is rare for 
 
the clear theme of . . . local representation applying local standards to the enforcement of essentially 
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a prosecutor to try to lessen a capital sentence after it has already been 
imposed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was understandably hesitant to 
embrace the changing definitions of executive versus judicial power.  Instead, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the case on an issue expressly for 
judicial review: Whether or not Mr. Brown had ineffective assistance of 
counsel throughout his trial.  In light of recent precedent, courts are split on 
whether it is appropriate for a prosecutor to reduce a sentence after it has 
already been imposed.  However, if District Attorneys in jurisdictions where 
courts are concerned about the separation of powers argue that they have 
different legal interpretations from their predecessors, more prosecutors 
could play a persuasive role in sentencing without infringing on judicial review.   
Especially if prosecutors are successful in making arguments of changed 
legal interpretations, legislatures may even enact statutes that allow for a 
prosecutor to lessen imposed sentences when both the prosecution and 
defense agree on this reduction.  Despite contemporary fears that this will give 
an undue benefit to the executive branch and supplant power from the 
judiciary, just as prosecutorial power has slowly expanded to the realm it is 
today, eventually, this may just be the next natural progression.  
As Akhil Amar notes in America’s Unwritten Constitution, the 
Constitution is a living, ever-changing document.116 Despite the physical text 
rarely changing, the Constitution always shifts to include and take into account 
the needs and aims of modern-day society.  The changes “support[] and 
supplement[] the written Constitution without supplanting it.”117 Expanding 
prosecutorial influence in sentencing will not “supplant” the court’s role as 
noted in Article III.  Rather, this determination will simply “supplement” 
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